# Security Boundaries

- Live Codex is refused unless `process.getuid() === 1005`.
- Only one registered isolated qualification project is writable.
- No Caribies, Hey CORI, PickleTok, Dispatch Spot, production repository, or
  unrelated account is registered.
- Jobs cannot carry commands, paths, environment, sandbox selection, or
  arbitrary fields.
- The CLI uses fixed argv, `shell: false`, `workspace-write`, canonical `-C`,
  bounded prompts, JSONL, and an output schema. Dangerous bypass flags are
  absent.
- Authentication readiness is reduced to a boolean. Tokens, config, hidden
  environment values, and auth files are never read by application code,
  copied, returned, or logged.
- The local boundary is a private mode-0700 file spool with HMAC envelopes,
  not HTTP and not publicly reachable.
- Timeout/output violations terminate the whole detached child process group.
- Project locks prevent simultaneous write workers.
- Structured audits redact credential-shaped keys and values.
- The Passenger API remains read-only for orchestration. No command,
  terminal, queue mutation, impersonation, or administrative endpoint exists.
- Sudo policy, root configuration, production gates, cPanel, DNS, SSH,
  firewall, and unrelated applications are unchanged.

The live qualification required explicit sandbox approval only because the
development tool sandbox initially prevented Codex from updating its own
existing user session state. The approved process still ran as UID 1005 with
Codex's workspace-write sandbox fixed to the isolated repository.
